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ABSTRACT 
We present results from an artefactual field experiment conducted in rural Peru that considers how 
observing nonreciprocal behavior influences an individual’s decision to reciprocate. Specifically, we 
consider the behavior of second movers in a trust game, assessing how their decision to reciprocate is 
influenced by the observed behavior of others and the extent to which their actions can be observed. In 
documenting how an external shock to the number observed not to reciprocate influences reciprocation, 
the paper endeavors to provide some insight into how reciprocity can unravel when individuals are 
learning behavior in a new market institution. 
Keywords: trust, norms, artefactual field experiment, Peru  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Mutual cooperation is essential to the development of many market institutions. Although simple spot 
market exchanges can take place in the presence of limited trust (Fafchamps 2004), market exchanges that 
entail trade in unobserved characteristics (such as trade in organic produce), trade with delayed delivery 
(such as in credit or insurance markets), or trade in which delivery is conditional on acts of nature (such 
as is often the case in contract farming) require a certain degree of trust or mutual cooperation. When the 
extent to which individuals are willing to trust and behave trustworthily is low, it is much more difficult 
for such markets to develop. 
Recent experimental analyses have shown that there is considerable variation across societies in 
the probability that an individual will choose to cooperate when there is a short-term gain to defection 
(Bowles et al. 2004). A number of empirical studies have examined the determinants of this 
heterogeneity. The starting point for this paper is the observation that the similarity in behavior of 
individuals from the same society is consistent with a model of human behavior in which an individual’s 
decision to reciprocate is influenced by the social environment that surrounds him or her (Manski 2000). 
This is in keeping with a large body of empirical and theoretical literature that suggests that the utility 
received from undertaking a particular action is in part determined by the extent to which it mimics the 
observed behavior of others.
1
Bernheim (1994) and subsequently Becker and Murphy (2000) delineate three channels by which 
the actions of others influence utility. The most basic is that of externalities: actions taken by others may 
increase (or decrease) the returns an individual receives from undertaking the same action (such as in the 
case of contributing to a public good). The second mechanism is informational: to the extent that an 
individual is unsure about appropriate or optimal behavior, and to the extent he or she believes others in 
the group are better informed, the behavior of others may provide a source of information on the course of 
action he or she should take. Third, social interactions can influence an individual’s preferences (Jones 
1984; Bernheim 1994; Becker and Murphy 2000). In particular, the models of conformism set out in 
Jones (1984) and Bernheim (1994) allow for an individual to derive utility from minimizing the extent to 
which his or her actions deviate from the average behavior of others.
 
2 In the context considered here, one 
can think of social interactions determining the esteem, acceptance, guilt, or shame an individual feels as 
a result of choosing to adhere to or deviate from a norm of reciprocity.
3
In this paper we present results from an artefactual field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) 
conducted in rural Peru that considers how observing non-reciprocal behavior influences an individual’s 
decision to reciprocate. Specifically, we consider the behavior of second movers in a trust game, assessing 
how their decision to reciprocate is influenced by the observed behavior of others in the same room and 
the extent to which their actions can be observed. In documenting how an external shock to the number of 
those observed not to reciprocate encourages others to deviate, the paper endeavors to provide some 
insight into how a norm of reciprocity can unravel when individuals are learning behavior in a new 
market institution. At a broader level of interpretation, it is an empirical investigation into the 
mechanisms by which social interactions affect behavior. 
 
Empirically identifying the processes that give rise to a positive relationship between the 
propensity of an individual to behave in a certain way and the prevalence of that behavior in the group is 
                                                   
1 Many empirical studies have documented how choices may be taken to mimic the observed behavior of others, but ones 
closely related to the case considered here are Asch (1951, 1955), Rosenbaum and Blake (1955), Rosenbaum (1956), Cason and 
Mui (1998), Falk and Knell (2004), Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005), and Croson and Shang (2008). 
2 Manski (2000) indicates that an action chosen by one agent may affect the actions of other agents through 
three channels: constraints, expectations, and preferences. These are essentially the same three channels. 
Externalities are a form of constraint interaction, information conveyed through observational learning is a form of 
expectation interaction (see also Chamley [2004]), and the third channel is a form of preference interaction. 
3 Elster (1989) discusses the role of social norms in economic theory and (1998) how different types of emotions affect 
social norms.  
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difficult. As Manski (2000) argues, a positive relationship between individual and group behavior could 
arise as a result of the influence of observed behavior (endogenous interactions), the influence of 
observed characteristics (contextual interactions), or individual and environmental characteristics shared 
by group members (correlated effects). This paper uses an experiment conducted in a controlled 
environment to identify the presence of endogenous interactions. Variation was exogenously introduced 
into the average observed behavior of the group, and this exogenous variation is used to identify the 
influence of observed behavior on individuals’ decisionmaking. We posit a model that suggests that 
endogenous interactions arise as a result of preference interactions between group members: as more 
group members are observed not to reciprocate, the cost of deviation for any individual falls, resulting in 
a higher propensity to deviate. 
Recently, two experimental studies have considered the degree to which shame and/or guilt 
explain an individual’s decision to adhere to a norm of equality (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009) and 
reciprocal cooperation (Tadelis 2008). The approach of this paper is similar, with one major distinction. 
Unlike the authors of these studies, we assume that the disutility felt in departing from the norm is not 
only dependent on the degree to which an individual’s actions are observed, that is, “audience effects” 
(Andreoni and Bernheim) or “extrinsic preferences for shame” (Tadelis), but is also to some extent 
determined by the share of peers that are observed to comply with the norm (as in Lindbeck, Nyberg, and 
Weibull [1999]). 
We study a twice-repeated trust game, as described in Bower, Garber, and Watson (1997), but 
allow for a population of players that can observe each other’s actions. We do so because our main 
interest is to study the influence of peer effects on behavior.
4 Although we present results for both the 
first mover (the player who decides whether or not to trust the other player by choosing to send money, 
denoted throughout as player A) and the second mover (the player who decides, having been trusted, 
whether or not to reciprocate that trust by sending money back to the first mover), in our analysis we are 
primarily interested in the second mover (player B). In particular, the focus of the paper is in studying 
player B’s propensity to conform to the norm, and in assessing the behavioral impact of externally 
induced variation in what she observes.
5
In the following sections we develop a model of choices in a twice-repeated trust game that 
incorporates the social environment (Section 2), describe the experiments (Section 3), and present 
empirical results (Section 4). Section 5 concludes.  




                                                   
4 Another important source of audience that has been discussed in the literature (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim 2009; Sobel 
2005) is the experimenter effect. This audience is fixed throughout our treatments. 
5 Throughout the paper, for ease of discussion, we use the convention that player B is female and player A is male; in the 
actual experiments, the gender balance was roughly equal.  
3 
2.  MODEL 
In this section we set out a model of a twice-repeated trust game between two players: player A, who is 
the first mover, and player B, who is the second mover. We allow player B’s utility to depend both on her 
own material payoff and on that of her partner.
6
As will be discussed below, the Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) setup lends itself nicely to 
developing such a model. 
 Furthermore, we seek to characterize how the social 
environment affects player B’s decisions. In particular, we are interested in considering how variation in 
the observed behavior of peers affects player B’s decision to reciprocate or not. We develop a model that 
allows player B’s utility to depend both on her own material payoff and on that of her partner. 
Specifically, player B’s willingness to pay for her partner’s monetary payoff is constructed to depend on 
(a) an inherent preference for reciprocity, (b) observation of her peers’ actions, and (c) the extent to which 
peers observe her actions. 
The Tice-repeated Trust Game 
Consider a population of   player As and   player Bs. The populations of player As and player Bs are in 
separate locations and although they can see other players that have the same “role,” player As cannot see 
player Bs, and likewise player Bs cannot see player As. We could think of this as corresponding to a 
situation in which farmers in one village may be trading with a set of traders from a nearby market that 
they do not know. These players are randomly matched such that some player A and some player B are 
assigned to a pair   (for  ) for the duration of the game. These   pairs play the twice-
repeated trust game. Our discussion pertains to some fixed pair   that is representative of all other pairs 
. 
In each period   (for  ), both player A and player B are given an initial endowment of  . 
Player A has a choice of two actions: he can exit the game, in which case both he and player B keep   
(denote this action as  ), or he can send   to player B (denote this action as  ). If he chooses   ,   is 
tripled and player B receives   in addition to the   she received at the beginning of the game. Player B 
now has a choice of two actions: she can equalize payoffs with player A by sending   back to player A 
(an action denoted as  ), or she can keep all   for herself (an action denoted as  ).
7
The one-shot trust game for period t is presented in extensive form in Figure 1. The payoffs 
displayed below the end nodes of the game tree are terminal payoffs. In our game these payoffs represent 
period (or stage) payoffs, as the one-shot trust game is repeated twice. Similarly to Bower, Garber, and 
Watson (1997), we assume that the terminal payoffs for the twice-repeated trust game are the sum of the 
stage payoffs and that there is no discounting. Given these assumptions, we construct the tree for the 
twice-repeated trust game in Figure 2. 
 The choice of 
terminology for the players’ actions, that is,  ,  ,  , and  , is intended to represent the following, 
respectively: exit, trust, defect, and reciprocate. 
                                                   
6 Sobel (2005) reviews models of interdependent preferences and reciprocity. He categorizes (a) distributional preference 
models (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002); (b) models with preferences over 
generalized consumption goods; (c) models of intrinsic reciprocity, also known as models with belief-dependent preferences 
(e.g., Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009); and (d) models of extrinsic reciprocity. 
7 We assume that   for all   and that   is bounded above by a maximum,  .  
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Figure 1. One-shot extensive-form trust game, period   
 
Figure 2. Twice-repeated extensive-form trust game 
 
Preferences, Observability, and Beliefs 
When we test the game in a naturally occurring environment, players face monetary payoffs that are the 
result of actions taken throughout the game protocol. It is thus important to specify players’ preferences 
over these payoffs. 
Since our main interest is player B’s behavior, we complicate the exposition only with regard to 
the second mover’s preferences. We let player A have self-regarding preferences that are strictly for 
increasing his monetary payoffs and unaffected by player B’s. In other words, player A’s per-period 
utility can be represented as an increasing function of only his monetary payoff, as follows: 
,   (1) 
with  . We assume   is additive in monetary payoffs across time periods such that all players rank 
terminal payoffs in the same manner as they rank stage payoffs and vice versa. 
We adopt the linear version of the Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) model of reciprocity and 
fairness to characterize player B’s preferences as depending on the monetary payoff she receives   and 
the monetary payoff player A receives  , as follows:  
.   (2) 
The most attractive feature of the Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad model for our setup is that   
represents an emotional state (as opposed to a type parameter) that is a function of reciprocity and status 
variables. This formulation lends itself nicely to our question because we can let   be a function that 
depends on an individual, time-invariant effect   that represents an inherent preference for reciprocity 
(i.e., type) and two social, possibly time-variant effects   and   that represent, respectively, the 
proportion of other player Bs that a given player B observes not reciprocating and the proportion of other  
5 
player Bs that observe a given player B. Notice that   is essentially the reciprocity variable   in the Cox, 
Friedman, and Gjerstad formulation, whereas   and   jointly represent the (relative) status variable 
. 
This formulation accommodates changes in player B’s emotional state   over time, thus 
allowing us to index   by  . For example, player B may observe distinct numbers of second movers 
defecting at different stages of the game. This will in turn affect player B’s emotional state  . This is 
different from a setup that treats   as a type parameter, as type parameters are typically assumed to be 
fixed across time. 
We formulate the emotional state function as  
   (3) 
Under the following assumptions: 
•  There are no spiteful states, that is,  , and there are no spiteful types, that is,  . 
The terminology “spiteful” is used here in the sense of Levine (1998). 
•  At the individual level, for any given level of relative social status   and  , more 
reciprocal types are (weakly) more willing to pay their own for others’ monetary payoffs, that 
is,  . 
•  At the social level, for any given level of reciprocity  , player B is (weakly) less willing to 
pay her own for the other’s monetary payoff as more player Bs are observed not 
reciprocating, that is,  . Similarly, player B is (weakly) more willing to pay her own 
for the other’s monetary payoff as more player Bs observe her, that is,  . 
•  A selfish (or self-regarding) individual with   is unaffected by social effects and 
therefore is not affected by player A’s monetary payoff. In other words, a selfish type is not 
willing to pay her own for the other’s payoff even in the presence of social effects, that is, 
for any   and  . This assumption also helps to ensure that we 
avoid a waiting game. The fact that every player B’s decision can depend on the decisions of 
other player Bs can give rise to a waiting game in which player B of pair   waits on player B 
of pair  ,   waits on   and   waits on  . In such a case every player B 
waits and the game stalls. We assume that in the presence of social effects, an action taken by 
at least one other player B is sufficient to influence player B’s decision. This assumption 
solves the waiting-game issue as long as there is a strictly positive proportion of self-
regarding types with   in the population. For this type, individual effects will trump 
social effects, inducing her to take actions independently of her peers. 
•  Individual effects persist when there are no social effects, that is, 
. 
This final assumption is not necessary for the analysis but ensures that linear models without 
social effects can arise as special cases of our setup. Additionally, the assumption regarding “no spiteful 
types” guarantees consistency with the first assumption of “no spiteful states” when social effects are not 
present, as states reduce to types (or monotone transformations thereof) in such cases. 
It is the assumptions made about the social influences on preferences that are the focus of this 
analysis. Consider an increase in  , the proportion of player Bs observed not reciprocating. As player B 
observes more player Bs not reciprocating, her willingness to pay her own for the other’s monetary payoff 
decreases. The social effects make her less likely to reciprocate trust. We can think of this as deviation 
from a norm of reciprocity becoming less embarrassing the more others do likewise. This is how the  
6 
relationship between social norms and economic incentives is characterized in Lindbeck, Nyberg, and 
Weibull (1999).
8
In deciding whether or not to trust, player A recognizes that player B’s decision to reciprocate or 
not when trusted will depend on the utility she receives. Player B’s per-period utility (recall expression 2) 
will take one of the following values if player A decides to trust. If player B reciprocates, then she 
achieves utility of  . If she defects then her utility is  . Given 
, player B prefers to reciprocate if and only if   and defect otherwise. Player A’s decision will 
thus hinge on whether he believes player B finds herself in a high (reciprocal) emotional state   or 
in a low (nonreciprocal) emotional state   in period  . 
 Similarly, consider an increase in M2t, the proportion of player Bs that observe any 
given player B. As more player Bs observe her decision, she becomes more willing to pay her own for the 
other’s monetary payoff. We could think of this as “shame,” but other emotions could be at play as well 
(Elster 1998). 
Player A starts the game with the prior belief   that the player B with whom he is partnered is in a 
high (reciprocal) emotional state in the first period, that is,  . Similarly, player A has a 
prior belief   that player B is in a high emotional state in the second period, that is,  . 
Player A updates the prior belief   at the end of the first period once he observes player B’s response. 
Player A’s updated probability   represents the belief that player B is in a high emotional state in the 
second period, conditional on information from the first period, that is,  . Although we have 
established that states may vary across time, player B’s type and the population of types are unchanged 
across periods, which induces some dependence between player B’s emotional state in the first and the 
second period. Player B’s response in the first period thus reveals information about   to player A such 
that  . 
This is information that player A receives only if he chooses the action  . If player A chooses 
the action  , player B is not given the opportunity to reveal information about herself. We can thus think 
of player A as gaining an informational advantage by choosing  , which allows him to hold more 
accurate beliefs about player B’s state in period 2. This brings with it some advantage. When player A 
holds correct beliefs, his expected payoff is  . When player A holds incorrect beliefs, his 
expected payoff is  . The gain that results from being correct is thus equal to  . The 
informational gain of participating in the first round is  , where   is the increase in accuracy of beliefs 
that results from participation in the first round. 
In period 1 player A chooses   if  , which is  . We see 
from this that player A chooses T1 if  . In round 2 there is no informational incentive to trust, and 
player A chooses T2 when  . 
Thus far we have ignored strategic motives for player B’s actions. In the final round, player B 
will indeed behave according to her true emotional state. Actions in the final period thus reveal states 
such that  . However, in the first round, player B may behave 
strategically, behaving as if she had a high emotional state, knowing that doing so would increase player 
A’s belief that  , inducing trust and allowing player B to choose   and receive  . Indeed, 
if player B believes that her first-round behavior has a large impact on player A’s beliefs, such that the 
difference between   and   is large, the optimal strategy for Player B would be 
. As signaling models teach us, cognizant of this, player A will be cautious in updating his 
beliefs based on first-round behavior such that   may be quite small. Although we refrain from modeling 
this formally (given that this is not our main focus), this discussion does make us aware that player B may 
chose   even if   and this will also be reflected in player A’s beliefs about the probability of 
. As a result of the strategic incentive present in the first round, we may expect (a) a higher 
                                                   
8 “The intensity of the norm, as perceived by the individual, is endogenous in our model: it depends on the number of people 
adhering to it. More exactly, we assume that living on transfers becomes relatively less embarrassing when more individuals do 
likewise” (Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull 1999, p.3).  
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occurrence of   than predicted by   and  , and (b) the occurrence of  to be higher than the 
occurrence of  . 
In summary, the model predicts the following for a given pair  . First, player A will trust player 
B if his prior beliefs about player B’s emotional states in the two periods are sufficiently optimistic. 
Second, player B’s response to trust in any given period depends on her emotional state, which is a 
function of her type  ; an individual, time-invariant effect; and (for player Bs of type  ) her social 
environment, as captured by two social, possibly time-variant effects,   (the proportion of player Bs 
observed not reciprocating) and   (the proportion of player Bs observing player B). Next we discuss 
the implications and predictions of the model in the presence of information shocks that reduce   and  . 
The Impact of Information that Reduces   and   
As will be discussed further in Section 3, we conducted a number of sessions of twice-repeated trust 
games in which in some sessions, some player As were randomly provided with information that would 
lower their prior beliefs that   and  . We can conceptualize this as an information shock that 
reduces   and  . The presence of the information shock was not made known to any player Bs, so its 
effect on player Bs results from changes in the behavior of player As. In this section we explore the 
impact of this shock on the behavior of the player A that received the shock, the partnering player B, and 
the other player Bs. Given the presence of social effects in the formulation of player B’s preferences, we 
expect that the information will have an effect on the player Bs that were not directly affected by the 
information shock. If social effects are not important in the formulation of player B’s preferences, such 
information shocks will affect only the behavior of the pair that experienced them. This is the basis of the 
empirical tests that we conduct. 
To better discuss the implications of such an information shock in our model, suppose there are 
two pairs   and  , and all other pairs are indicated by the set  . Consider pair  . The information we 
provide pushes   downward. Suppose this push makes player A  distrust (i.e.,  ). Consider 
pair . Suppose the information pushes   downward, but not enough to induce lack of trust (i.e., 
). Player B  is trusted in the first period and must decide whether or not to reciprocate. Finally, 
suppose that all player As in the set   trust in the first period and that a subset of the corresponding player 
Bs reciprocate. 
Although the information shock has no direct impact on player B , the social environment in 
which player B  makes her decision is different than the environment in which   is not shocked 
downward. Player B  makes her decision in an environment in which less reciprocation is likely to be 
observed because (a) player A  did not trust, causing player B  to be observed not to reciprocate, and (b) 
conditional on having been trusted, the player Bs in set   may defect more frequently as they observe the 
apparent nonreciprocation of player B .  
The fact that the information shock induces player As to trust less frequently causes player Bs to 
observe less reciprocation (as in pair  ). This pushes   upward and reduces player B ’s willingness to 
sacrifice her own for the other’s monetary payoff, even though the shock did not affect the behavior of 
player A . Essentially, player B  makes her decision in an environment in which reciprocation is less 
prevalent, which makes it less costly for her to defect. Note that  , the proportion of player Bs 
observing her actions, is unchanged by the downward shock to   and  . Given the discussion of strategic 
behavior above, we expect round 2 behavior to be more closely driven by  . Thus, we would expect the 
behavioral impact of changes in   to be stronger in the second round. 
In addition, we might expect alternative channels through which effects may occur. For example, 
player B  may observe less reciprocation in the set   if a subset of player B s react to less trust by either 
updating their beliefs about the types in the player A population or punishing their own player As to send 
a signal to the population of player As. For example, some player B s may fail to reciprocate when trusted 
because they observe other player Bs (such as player B ) not being trusted and, accordingly, believe that 
their corresponding player As are less likely to trust next period after having observed distrust on the part  
8 
of other player As this period. Alternatively, some player B s may fail to reciprocate in an attempt to 
punish player As for the distrust exhibited toward their peers this period. Although our model is silent in 
these respects, we note that both of these lines of reasoning predict effects in the first period of the game.  
9 
3.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
To test these hypotheses we conducted artefactual field experiments with 308 randomly selected 
individuals from seven rural communities surrounding the city of Huaral, 75 kilometers north of Lima 
(see Figure 3). In total, eight sessions were conducted.
9
Figure 3. Huaral communities in the intervention  
 Each session involved a group of around 18 
player As and a group of around 18 player Bs located in separate communities. 
 
                                                   
9 Prior to these sessions, one pilot session was conducted in the same communities for smaller stakes to test the experimental 
protocol. Given the much smaller stakes used, these data are not used in the analysis.  
10 
In five sessions a twice-repeated trust game (TG) was conducted. The TG was described in 
Section 2. In three sessions a slightly modified version of the same game—the modified trust game 
(MTG)—was conducted. The only difference between the TG and the MTG was that in the latter, player 
As received information about the likelihood that player Bs would reciprocate trust if trusted. We 
essentially shocked a main experimental parameter (player A’s prior belief that player B would 
reciprocate) in order to create an instrument for identifying an endogenous social interaction effect. This 
approach can be compared to that of Casari, Ham, and Kagel (2007). 
In the MTG all player As were told that in previous sessions almost half of player Bs chose not to 
reciprocate (this was based on the final-round behavior of the first experimental sessions of the TG), and 
those player As who were paired with player Bs who had chosen “keep all / send nothing” in the dictator 
game (discussed below) were informed of their partner’s choice in that game. This information was given 
to reduce the likelihood that player As would choose to send. No information was conveyed to player Bs. 
The TG and MTG protocols were thus identical from player B’s point of view. 
The protocol for the TG and MTG is described in detail in the Appendix. Here we highlight two 
important features of the protocol followed. 
Our primary aim is to assess how exogenously induced changes in the behavior player B observes 
alters her decision to reciprocate. Thus, it was important that we allow player Bs to observe their peers. 
To achieve this we stepped away from the standard (single- or double-blind) protocol of isolating 
experimental subjects. While subjects were instructed not to interact with each other, the experimental 
protocol allowed for visual observation of one’s peers. This was facilitated by the use of white envelopes 
for keeping vouchers and yellow envelopes for sending vouchers. As the experimental protocol details 
further, however, player Bs were isolated from player As. Player Bs were located in one village, while 
player As were located in another. 
We compare player B decisions across sessions to study the extent to which observing fewer 
people reciprocating trust (as a result of fewer people being trusted in the MTG sessions) makes an 
individual more or less likely to deviate from the norm of reciprocation. The key to our identification 
strategy is the introduction of an exogenous and credible information shock on player A’s side, of which 
player B is unaware, which induces a change in the peer behavior that player B observes. This allows us 
to circumvent the problem of identification in the presence of what Manski (2000) terms the “reflection 
problem.” 
Although the TG and MTG protocols were identical for player Bs, it is possible for unobserved 
session-specific heterogeneity to cause variation in behavior across sessions. This can be controlled for in 
the empirical analysis by including session dummies. However, we can also use within-session 
heterogeneity in observability to construct individual-specific (rather than session-specific) measures of 
what was observed. To allow for this, seating was randomly determined at the beginning of the 
experiment session and held fixed throughout the session. The results section discusses the robustness of 
our results with regard to various spatial specifications. 
In addition, in the week prior to participation in the trust games, all participants took part in a 
dictator game (DG). The DG is a two-player, one-shot, dichotomous-choice game in which the first 
mover has a choice between “keep all / send nothing” and “keep half / send half.” The choice determines 
both the individual’s own terminal payoff and the payoff of the individual’s partner. All subjects played 
this game in the role of dictator. So subjects who played the role of player B in the main treatments also 
played the role of first mover in the DG. These data are used to control for players’ raw other-regarding 
preferences in the analysis and to provide information in the MTG. 
The DG was conducted during the listing of households, which occurred a week before the TG 
and MTG sessions were conducted. We chose to conduct the DG during listing for three reasons. First, 
conducting the DG days in advance mitigates potential confounding effects arising from subjects 
participating in several experimental treatments close together. Second, this ensures that the experimenter 
during the DG (i.e., the enumerator) is different from the person who actually pays the subject for his or 
her DG decision (i.e., the experiment assistant for the main treatment). Finally, this allows the MTG 
sessions to move faster, as the DG decisions are used as information during the MTG.  
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The DG involved the following steps. (1) The enumerator explained the game and payment 
procedures to the subject. The enumerator informed the subject that if he or she were selected to 
participate in the study, he or she would be paid for this choice. The enumerator encouraged the subject 
to, therefore, make his or her preferred choice. The enumerator also informed the subject that the choice 
would not affect the likelihood of being selected for participation in the study. (2) The subject was then 
handed a sheet of paper with the two options (“keep all / send nothing” and “keep half / send half”) and 
an envelope. The instructions were to (a) circle the preferred choice in private, (b) fold the sheet of paper, 
(c) place the folded sheet of paper in the envelope, (d) seal the envelope, and (e) hand the envelope back 
to the enumerator. (3) The enumerator was explicitly informed not to interfere with the subject’s 
decisionmaking process. Furthermore, the enumerator coded the subject’s envelope with his or her unique 
household ID only after leaving the listed subject’s household. (4) Listed subjects who participated in the 
experiment received payment for their DG decisions at the end of the TG or MTG, depending on which 
treatment they participated in. These earnings were received in addition to any earnings from participation 
in the main treatment.  
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4.  DATA AND RESULTS 
Data 
Situated in the valley of the Chancay river, the Huaral area is one of Lima’s main providers of fresh 
produce, poultry, and pork, which is why it is known as “Lima’s pantry.” Not surprisingly, the main 
income-generating activity for most of the households in Huaral is market-oriented agriculture. In spite of 
this, the majority of land parcels are small and poverty is still highly prevalent in the area.  
The seven communities selected for the intervention were chosen based on (a) classification as 
rural by Peru’s National Statistics Bureau (INEI), and (b) size. Selected communities had at least 100 
households in the community.
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The experiments on average lasted two and a half hours, and average earnings were 34.08 soles 
(standard deviation: 16.88), which represents more than 6 percent of the local monthly minimum wage. 
Every participant responded to a short household survey near the end of his or her session, from which the 
basic characteristics of our sample were obtained. These are summarized in Table 1, compared by player 
role and type of game. T-tests of the differences in means between the types of game (TG and MTG) for 
each group of players (A and B) were provided in the table in order to determine whether the participants 
in the MTG sessions were different in observable characteristics from those in the TG sessions (even 
though participation in MTG and TG sessions was determined randomly). 
 Player A and player B sessions were conducted in separate communities 
simultaneously in order to guarantee that participants knew as little as possible about the individuals they 
had been paired with. 
Table 1.  Sample means of basic characteristics by player and type of game  











Game  Difference 
Female  0.687  0.702  -0.015      0.554  0.649  -0.095   
  (0.051)  (0.061)  (0.080)      (0.055)  (0.064)  (0.085)   
Age  44.517  36.381  8.136      44.428  39.825  4.603   
  (1.749)  (1.673)  (2.602)  ***  (1.678)  (1.782)  (2.513)  * 
Schooling  5.215  4.992  0.224      5.003  5.113  -0.110   
  (0.108)  (0.135)  (0.175)      (0.099)  (0.118)  (0.154)   
Any children  0.892  1.000  -0.108      0.940  0.893  0.047   
  (0.034)  (0.000)  (0.044)  **    (0.026)  (0.042)  (0.047)   
Household size  4.458  4.720  -0.262      4.554  4.875  -0.321   
  (0.202)  (0.262)  (0.331)      (0.174)  (0.292)  (0.320)   
Quecha-speaking mother  0.313  0.491  -0.202      0.325  0.228  0.097   
  (0.051)  (0.067)  (0.083)  **    (0.052)  (0.056)  (0.078)   
Father’s schooling  5.048  4.200  0.848      4.819  4.571  0.248   
  (0.428)  (0.434)  (0.646)      (0.381)  (0.451)  (0.594)   
Catholic  0.819  0.807  0.012      0.892  0.842  0.049   
  (0.042)  (0.053)  (0.067)      (0.034)  (0.049)  (0.058)   
Rooms in house  3.892  3.140  0.752      4.169  3.375  0.794   
  (0.181)  (0.225)  (0.291)  **    (0.192)  (0.203)  (0.287)  *** 
                                                   
10 The communities were San Jose, Cuyo, Esperanza, La Huaca, La Caporala, Retes, and Miraflores.  
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Table 1. Continued  











Game  Difference 
Land (ha.)  1.495  0.332  1.164      1.010  0.482  0.528   
  (0.369)  (0.172)  (0.494)  **    (0.283)  (0.168)  (0.372)   
Household annual income
b  8.667  5.906  2.762      8.667  5.280  3.387   
  (1.138)  (0.779)  (1.519)  *    (1.146)  (0.549)  (1.457) 
** 
Household wealth status
c  4.494  4.460  0.034      4.590  4.911  -0.320   
  (0.102)  (0.141)  (0.171)      (0.097)  (0.115)  (0.151) 
** 
Ever paid in advance  0.157  0.080  0.077      0.145  0.071  0.073   
  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.060)      (0.039)  (0.035)  (0.055)   
Ever received payment in  0.205  0.080  0.125      0.146  0.036  0.109   
advance  (0.045)  (0.039)  (0.065)  *    (0.039)  (0.025)  (0.052) 
** 
Lent money often  1.518  1.360  0.158      1.518  1.250  0.268   
  (0.065)  (0.080)  (0.104)      (0.067)  (0.058)  (0.095) 
*** 
Sent in dictator game
d  0.727  0.750  -0.023      0.803  0.750  0.053   
  (0.051)  (0.063)  (0.082)      (0.049)  (0.083)  (0.093)   
Observations  83  57           83  57       
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%. 
b In thousands of soles. 
c Self-reported, 1 being “richest” and 6 being “poorest.” 
d Dictator game results were not available for 6 pairings in the Trust Game and 9 pairings in the Modified Trust Game. 
Table 1 show that there are some significant differences among participants in TG and MTG 
sessions. Compared to the average player in an MTG session, the average player A in a TG session is 
older, is less likely to have children, is less likely to have a mother who is a native Quechua speaker, lives 
in a larger house, has more land, has a higher annual income, and is more likely to have received 
payments in advance. The average player B in a TG session is older, lives in a larger house, has a higher 
annual income, considers herself better off, has received payments in advance more often, and has lent 
money more often. 
For our purposes, however, what matters is whether any of these differences have an effect on 
decisions to keep or send back money in the game, in the absence of the information treatment. We argue 
that the DG response from the listing stage of the experiment (see Appendix) is a good proxy for 
reciprocal tendencies, and we run a regression of this against the basic characteristics. The results are 
shown in Table 2. In the basic DG, we found that 24 percent of individuals responded that they would 
choose to keep all the money given to them (25 percent of player As and 23 percent of player Bs). We 
observe that only income and having lent money in the past are significantly related to the decision to 
send money in the DG. Given that there are some significant differences in these variables between 
players in TG and MTG sessions (particularly for player B participants), we use them as controls in all 
our estimations to control for possible selection bias on these observable characteristics. 
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Table 2. Determinants of sending behavior in dictator game 
Dependent variable: 1 if sent, 0 if kept       
     
Female   0.022   
  (0.063)   
Age
b  0.001   
  (0.002)   
Schooling
b  0.035   
  (0.032)   
Any children   -0.022   
  (0.115)   
Household size   -0.006   
  (0.016)   
Mother’s 1st language: Quechua   -0.052   
  (0.061)   
Father’s schooling   0.001   
  (0.009)   
Catholic   -0.029   
  (0.082)   
Rooms in house   -0.001   
  (0.018)   
Land (ha.)   0.017   
  (0.013)   
Household annual income   0.007   
  (0.004)  ** 
Household self-reported wealth status   -0.001   
  (0.032)   
Ever paid in advance   0.007   
  (0.088)   
Ever received payment in advance   -0.008   
  (0.086)   
Lent money often   0.089   
  (0.052)  * 
Constant   0.396   
  (0.326)   
     
Observations
c  246    
R
2  0.08    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%. 
b Imputed missing values for 29 observations. 
c For this regression we pooled together the responses of all participants (player As and Bs). 
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Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the game trees (full, and separating sessions with and without 
information), indicating how the 140 pairs of participants are distributed along the decision process. Only 
slightly more (26 percent) player Bs chose to keep the money in round 1 than in the DG; however, a much 
higher proportion, 36 percent, chose to keep the money in round 2. The game tree suggests that in the 
MTG sessions there was a difference in both player A and B behavior: fewer player As sent and, 
conditional on being sent money, fewer player Bs reciprocated in the second and final round. It is these 
differences, particularly the latter, that we seek to explain in the following analysis. 
Figure 4. Distribution of moves along twice-repeated trust game (all sessions) 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of moves along twice-repeated trust game (“no info” sessions) 
 




We begin by assessing the impact of information on player A behavior. We would expect that being 
provided with the information that one has been partnered with a self-regarding type would discourage 
player A from sending (the downward shock in   described in the final subsection of Section 2), and the 
game tree also seems to suggest that this is the case (Figures 5 and 6). This is tested in Tables 3 and 4, 
which regress trusting behavior on whether information was provided, the level of stakes, and individual 
controls. It is important to control for the history of round 1 in assessing round 2 results. To do this, we 
construct the history variable as 1 if player B defected in round 1, that is, behaved untrustworthily, and 0 
if she reciprocated or had not been trusted by player A for starters. The key finding from these tables is 
that introducing information greatly reduces the probability that player A will trust. This exogenously 
affects the environment in which player Bs make their decisions (given that player B is unaware player A 
was provided with information), which is crucial for our analysis.  
Although information has strong effects in both rounds, the role of information changes between 
rounds 1 and 2. In round 1 it is personal information that plays the largest role in determining behavior, 
with no impact of information on trusting behavior for those who were not provided with information on 
the person they were playing with. In round 2, the provision of information now has an impact at the 
group level, with those who were provided personal information being no more likely to exit than other 
player As in the room who were not provided with information. The results suggest that when player A 
observes more nonreciprocal behavior among the partners of his fellow player As (as is the case in the 
information treatments as shown below), he will choose not to send.  
Table 3. Player A in round 1 
Dependent variable: 1 if trust, 0 if exit                
             
Stake = 10   -0.015    -0.010    -0.026   
  (0.065)    (0.065)    (0.067)   
Personal information   -0.377    -0.460       
  (0.113) 
***  (0.102) 
***   
Information   -0.119        -0.231   
  (0.074)        (0.068) 
*** 
Household annual income  0.005    0.005    0.003   
  (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)   
Lent money often   0.013    0.016    0.037   
  (0.057)    (0.057)    (0.059)   
Constant  0.854    0.805    0.833   
  (0.102) 
***  (0.098) 
***  (0.105) 
*** 
             
Observations  133     133     133    
R
2  0.18     0.16     0.10    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%. 
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Table 4. Player A in round 2 
Dependent variable: 1 if trust, 0 if exit                
             
Stake = 10   0.241    0.248    -0.241   
  (0.073) 
***  (0.073) 
***  (0.072) 
*** 
Personal information   0.296    -0.075       
  (0.129)    (0.117)       
Information   -0.154        -0.146   
  (0.083) 
*      (0.074) 
* 
B did not reciprocate  -0.426    -0.433    -0.423   
in round 1  (0.074) 
***  (0.075) 
***  (0.073) 
*** 
Household annual income  -0.002    -0.001    -0.002   
  (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)   
Lent money often   0.048    0.052    0.045   
  (0.064)    (0.064)    (0.063)   
Constant  0.703    0.642    0.704   
  (0.115) 
***  (0.111) 
***  (0.114) 
*** 
             
Observations  133     133     133    
R
2  0.29     0.27     0.29    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%. 
To analyze player B’s decision to defect or reciprocate, we regress the choice to defect on the 
same controls, and additionally on  , the proportion of other player Bs who do not reciprocate (whether 
they were trusted or not) in each round. We now know   is driven in part by the information provided 
in player A’s sessions. However, given that our model is one of interdependence between the choices of 
player Bs, we cannot assume that, for a given player B, the proportion of other player Bs in the room who 
chose to defect was not in turn caused by the behavior of that player (what Manski [2000] refers to as the 
reflection problem). It is thus necessary to instrument for the proportion of player Bs observed to defect. 
Given that this proportion increases exogenously with the provision of information (as fewer player As 
trusted), we use a dummy of the provision of information as an instrument. In particular, we use a dummy 
that takes the value of 1 if player B was in a session in which, unbeknownst to her, information was 
provided to player As, thereby discouraging trusting. Ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental 
variable (IV) results for first-round behavior are presented in Table 5, and OLS and IV results for second-
round behavior are presented in Table 6. 
Table 5 indicates that in round 1  , the proportion of other participants not reciprocating, has 
no significant effect on player B’s behavior. This is true for both the OLS and instrumented regressions. 
However, in round 2   has a strong effect on player B’s behavior. The more players observed not 
reciprocating, the more probable it is that player B will decide to defect when having the choice.
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11 We run regressions (1) and (3) using the proportion of other players not reciprocating in the previous round instead of the 
concurrent round. The effect seems to be immediate, as what happens in the room in the present round seems to explain more of 
the variation in behavior than does the behavior of others in previous rounds. 
 The 
insignificance of social influences in the first round, despite their significance in the second, is consistent 
with the model predictions, which suggest that strategic motives play a role in whether or not a self-
regarding individual reciprocates or defects at this stage.  
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Table 5. Player B in round 1 
Dependent variable: 1 if   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
defect, 0 if reciprocate








                 
Proportion of Bs not   0.069    0.067    -0.777    -0.787   
reciprocating, M1
c   (0.321)    (0.324)    (0.676)    (0.685)   
Proportion of Bs       0.010        0.059   
not seen, M2       (0.162)        (0.170)   
Stake = 10   0.063    0.064    0.164    0.166   
  (0.096)    (0.097)    (0.121)    (0.123)   
Household annual income   -0.003    -0.003    -0.003    -0.003   
  (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)   
Lent money often   -0.112    -0.112    -0.136    -0.137   
  (0.077)    (0.077)    (0.081) 
*  (0.081) 
* 
Constant   0.369    0.364    0.713    0.681   
  (0.183) 
**  (0.203) 
*  (0.305) 
**  (0.305) 
** 
                 
Observations  112     112     112     112    
R
2  0.04     0.04                
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%. 
b Conditional on being trusted by player A. 
c Defecting (by own choice) or because they were not trusted by player A. 
As discussed in the final subsection of Section 2, player B’s behavior may also be driven by 
whether or not other player Bs are trusted. In other words, player B may observe other player Bs not 
reciprocating purely because they were never trusted. This is different than a situation in which player B 
is trusted and decides to defect. If player B is indeed reacting to this information, the main story would be 
one of updating prior beliefs about emotional states in the player A population. We believe this story to be 
unlikely for a few reasons. First, player B already knows the action that her paired player A took when 
she takes her decision. So, updating is less relevant in this context, particularly since players knew that 
they were playing with the same person in both rounds. Second, even if player B were reacting to this 
information, we would expect her to be more likely to defect in the first round in anticipation of her 
paired player A exiting in the next round. Given that our main effects are for the second round, we think 
this is an implausible story. Finally, we ran an auxiliary regression including the number of player Bs not 
reciprocating, the number being trusted, and an interaction term between these two terms, which showed 
that the number of player Bs being trusted has no direct effect on defecting behavior, but only an indirect 
one through its impact on reciprocation. 
In columns (2) and (4) of Tables 5 and 6 we also include the proportion of people sitting behind a 
given player as a measure for   in the model. Seating was randomly assigned to individuals so 
variation in   was randomly determined. Seating remained constant between rounds, that is,  . 
As the proportion of people sitting behind the player increases, we would expect the probability that the 
player adheres to the norm of reciprocity rises (as the disutility that arises from being observed to deviate 
from the social norm increases). Again, in round 1 this measure of the social environment is insignificant 
in explaining player behavior. However, in round 2 we observe that the players’ location in the room does  
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have an influence on reciprocating behavior, with those located at the front of the room being more 
inclined to reciprocate than those located at the back of the room, where their actions are less observed.  
Table 6. Player B in round 2 
Dependent variable: 1 if   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
defect, 0 if reciprocate








                 
Proportion of Bs not   0.606    0.622    0.692    0.770   
reciprocating, M1
c   (0.195) 
***  (0.192) 
***  (0.329) 
**  (0.325) 
** 
Proportion of Bs       -0.332        -0.338   
not seen, M2       (0.179) 
*      (0.180) 
* 
Stake = 10   -0.011    0.001    -0.015    -0.006   
  (0.108)    (0.107)    (0.109)    (0.108)   
A trusted in round 1  0.259    0.211    0.263    0.217   
  (0.183)    (0.182)    (0.184)    (0.183)   
B did not reciprocate  0.385    0.364    0.385    0.364   
in round 1
c  (0.141) 
***  (0.140) 
***  (0.141) 
***  (0.140) 
** 
Household annual income   -0.002    -0.002    -0.002    -0.001   
  (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)   
Lent money often   -0.007    -0.009    -0.003    -0.003   
  (0.077)    (0.077)    (0.081) 
*  (0.081) 
* 
Constant   -0.254    -0.020    -0.308    -0.108   
  (0.281)    (0.305)    (0.326)    (0.343)   
                 
Observations  94     94     94     94    
R
2  0.18     0.21     0.18     0.21    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%.  
b Conditional on being trusted by player A. 
c Defecting (by own choice) or because they were not trusted by player A. 
Does Observed Behavior Increase or Decrease Reciprocity? 
Before assessing the robustness of our results, we first explore whether observed behavior is encouraging 
individuals to conform to or deviate from their previously disclosed preference for reciprocating. One 
way to test this idea is to find a proxy for what the individual would do in the absence of the group. We 
can think of this as a measure of the participant’s true choice. As per the model, this reflects the optimal 
choice of   for utility given by   (i.e., utility with no peer 
effects). However, when the participant has to choose in a group setting, he or she might prefer to 
conform or deviate from this preference, depending on what he or she observes others doing. As a proxy 
for what the individual might do in the absence of the group, we use a preference for equality that was 
expressed in the choices made in the DG prior to participating in the TG or MTG. 
In Table 7 we test the effect of the DG results and its interaction with the proportion not 
reciprocating in the room. We can appreciate in the second column that the proportion not reciprocating 
appears to matter for those who sent in the DG, while nonsenders (in the DG) are unaffected. This is true  
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only for round 2 behavior.
12 In Table 8 we constructed a new dependent variable: 1 if the player’s 
response diverges from what she did in the DG and 0 otherwise. This measure of divergence is regressed 
on the proportion of other player Bs not reciprocating and the usual set of controls. The first two columns 
present results for all player Bs, while the second two columns include only those who chose to send in 
the DG.
13 The results in column 3 show that for those participants who claim they would send in the DG, 
the probability of diverging increases as more people around them do not reciprocate. This confirms that, 
in the second round, player B is more likely to diverge from her DG response when she observes others 
not reciprocating.
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Table 7. Comparing player B in round 2 with dictator game (DG) results 
  
B defects,  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
round 2  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
Sent in DG   0.111    -0.045    0.080    0.206   
  (0.151)    (0.346)    (0.160)    (0.609)   
Proportion of Bs not   0.549        0.835       
reciprocating, M1   (0.246) 
**      (0.501)       
M1 × Sent in DG       0.604        0.645   
      (0.271) 
**      (0.518)   
M1 × Kept in DG       0.255        0.890   
      (0.639)        (1.211)   
Proportion of Bs not   -0.403    -0.400    -0.377    -0.393   
seen, M2   (0.233) 
*  (0.234) 
*  (0.239)    (0.240)   
Stake = 10   0.087    0.111    0.053    0.054   
  (0.138)    (0.147)    (0.149)    (0.174)   
Household annual income  -0.002    -0.002    -0.002    -0.002   
  (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.011)   
Lent money often   -0.005    -0.011    -0.013    -0.004   
  (0.099)    (0.100)    (0.101)    (0.104)   
A trusted in round 1   0.005    -0.021    0.015    0.025   
  (0.253)    (0.260)    (0.256)    (0.276)   
B did not reciprocate   0.163    0.156    0.185    0.178   
in round 1   (0.220)    (0.222)    (0.226)    (0.228)   
Constant   0.105    0.243    -0.013    -0.047   
  (0.384)    (0.475)    (0.429)    (0.673)   
                 
Observations  65     65     65     65    
R
2  0.20     0.20     0.18     0.18    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%. 
 
                                                   
12 In round 1, the DG results did not have any explanatory power, either when entered directly 
or interacted with the proportion of people sending. 
13 We cannot run a regression for those who chose to keep in the DG due to insufficient observations. 
14 Again, a similar exercise for round 1 behavior yielded no significant results, and these results are omitted to save space.  
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Table 8. Explaining divergence from dictator game results 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 










Proportion of Bs not   0.177    0.124    0.586    0.714   
reciprocating, M1   (0.279)    (0.552)    (0.282)  **  (0.551)   
Proportion of Bs not   -0.310    -0.315    -0.484    -0.470   
seen, M2   (0.267)    (0.272)    (0.281)  *  (0.286)   
Stake = 10   0.042    0.049    0.139    0.135   
  (0.158)    (0.170)    (0.156)    (0.157)   
Household annual 
income  -0.010    -0.010    0.000    0.000   
  (0.012)    (0.012)    (0.012)    (0.012)   
Lent money often   -0.040    -0.038    -0.037    -0.043   
  (0.113)    (0.114)    (0.111)    (0.113)   
A trusted in round 1   -0.042    -0.045    -0.120    -0.129   
  (0.290)    (0.291)    (0.327)    (0.329)   
B did not reciprocate   -0.055    -0.061    0.010    0.016   
in round 1   (0.251)    (0.256)    (0.286)    (0.288)   
Constant   0.686    0.712    0.380    0.319   
  (0.426)    (0.489)    (0.459)    (0.512)   
Observations  65     65     65     65    
R
2  0.06     0.06     0.18     0.18    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%. 
These results suggest that people who would normally reciprocate are encouraged not to when 
they observe others deviating from the norm of reciprocation.
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Testing for Imitation in the Face of an Unknown Situation 
 However, we note that in both cases, once 
the proportion of other players not reciprocating is instrumented, the variables of interest become 
insignificant (although the sign remains consistent). In the following, we explore alternative measures of 
the proportion of people observed not to reciprocate. However, first, we consider whether there is any 
evidence of imitation as a result of limited understanding of how to play the game. 
A participant might be influenced by what other players in the session are doing if he or she does not 
understand the game or lacks the ability to decide on his or her own. In this case, a participant may choose 
to imitate the behavior of others assuming that this is indeed optimal behavior for the novel situation with 
which he or she is presented. We attempt to proxy the lack of ability to decide with education, age, and 
mother’s native language. If the imitation hypothesis is right, we would expect that the influence of other 
participants (the proportion not reciprocating) should be less for players with higher ability (more 
educated, younger, or with Spanish-speaking mothers). The interaction between the proportion not 
reciprocating in the room and the proxy for ability would be significant and negatively correlated with 
reciprocating.  
                                                   
15 Given the small numbers, it is hard to tell what the impact of group behavior is on those who would normally keep.  
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Table 9 shows the results for these tests and offers little support for the imitation hypothesis. 
Although education does appear to play a role in round 2 in that the R-squared increases to 0.29, the level 
of schooling and the interaction between the proportion of keepers and schooling is not significant. This 
suggests that imitation does not have a stronger effect for those who we might expect to be less likely to 
understand the game.
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Table 9. Testing for imitation in round 2 
   
B defects, round 2  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Proportion of Bs not reciprocating, M1   1.629    0.515    0.647   
  (0.977)    (0.647)    (0.234)  *** 
Schooling  -0.054           
  (0.116)           
M1 × Schooling  -0.193           
  (0.190)           
Age      0.002       
      (0.008)       
M1 × Age      0.002       
      (0.014)       
Quechua-speaking mother          0.049   
          (0.251)   
M1 × Quechua-speaking mother          -0.116   
          (0.492)   
Proportion of Bs not seen, M2   -0.436    -0.350    -0.335   
  (0.177)  **  (0.184)  *  (0.183)  * 
Stake = 10   -0.026    -0.001    0.012   
  (0.102)    (0.107)    (0.118)   
Household annual income  0.001    -0.003    -0.002   
  (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)   
Lent money often   -0.018    -0.011    -0.010   
  (0.081)    (0.085)    (0.086)   
A trusted in round 1   0.042    0.223    0.213   
  (0.182)    (0.184)    (0.185)   
B did not reciprocate in round 1   0.304    0.386    0.362   
  (0.135)  **  (0.143)  ***  (0.143)  ** 
Constant   0.462    -0.114    -0.037   
  (0.663)    (0.465)    (0.332)   
Observations  94     94     94    
R
2  0.18     0.21     0.18    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%. 
                                                   
16 It is possible that education could be capturing an income effect. However, interestingly (and rather surprisingly), the 
effect of education on household income is not significant when we estimate a basic earnings equation. A possible explanation 
for this might be the high number of women not participating in the labor market in our sample of participants, as well as the low 
returns to education in the types of jobs the household members in our sample are engaging in.  
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Determining who is Observed 
Thus far we have considered only the impact of the average behavior of other player Bs in influencing 
player B’s choice to reciprocate. However, given that the location of the players varies in the room, we 
would expect players’ ability to observe the actions of other players to vary. As a result, a measure of the 
average behavior of other player Bs may not be the appropriate measure for what a given player observes. 
In this subsection we test the robustness of our results for alternate measures. First, we define the 
following:  
•  Players seen: The number of participants in the same row and in the rows in front of the 
player 
•  Proportion of players seen who do not reciprocate: The number of players seen not 
reciprocating divided by the number of players seen 
In columns 1 and 2 of Tables 10 and 11 we use the proportion of players seen who do not 
reciprocate in place of the total proportion of other player Bs who do not reciprocate. When including the 
proportion of players seen who do not reciprocate, we observe very similar results to those presented 
earlier for the total proportion of other players in the room who do not reciprocate. However, in these 
regressions the proportion of players not seen no longer has a significant effect on behavior. This suggests 
that the significance of the proportion of players not seen in previous regressions arose as a result of the 
fact that an individual’s position in the room determines the degree to which average behavior was 
observed. The insignificance of the proportion not seen in the Table 10 regressions indicates that shame is 
not such an important determinant of player behavior. 
We further explore this issue by constructing a more flexible (and less dichotomous) variable to 
capture the impact of the players’ ability to see other players’ actions (given their location in the room). 
As before, the players not seen by any given player are those sitting in the rows behind him or her. 
However, we no longer assume that the player is able to observe the actions of everybody else in the same 
row and in the rows in front of him or her, at least not to the same degree. Building concentric semicircles 
around each player, we can assume that each of them can observe the actions of the other players in the 
different semicircles around him or her with varying degrees of difficulty. Evidently, the further away the 
other player is, the harder it will be to observe his or her actions. 
The logic behind the concentric semicircles measure is better understood by looking at Figure 7. 
From player 15’s point of view, the players in the back row (17 to 20) are in his or her “blind spot.” 
Players 10, 11, 12, 14, and 16 are immediately next to him or her and are the most observable. Players in 
the second row (5 to 8) and players 9 and 13 have one player in between player 15 and themselves, so we 
can assume their actions are slightly more hidden. Players in the front row (1 to 4) are two players away 
from player 15, and hence even harder to observe. Thus, we build this measure by giving different 
weights to the players seen not reciprocating depending on the concentric semicircle they belong to.
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Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 10 and 11 include the concentric semicircles measure assuming only 
the first semicircle around the player is visible to him or her, while columns 5 and 6 assume the first 
semicircle is four times as visible as the other semicircles. We find that this last specification improves 
the R-squared considerably, giving us more robust results.   
  
 
                                                   
17 Notice that our initial measure, the proportion of players seen who do not reciprocate, used in columns 1 and 2 of Tables 
10 and 11, is just a special case of the concentric semicircles measure in which all the circles have the same weight.  
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Table 10. Robustness checks: Improving the measure of what is observed (dependent variable is 
defection in round 2) 
B defects,  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 















                         
Proportion of Bs seen  0.570    0.668                   
not reciprocating  (0.181) 
***  '(0.282) 
**                 
Semicircle          0.117    0.194    0.083    0.094   
measure          '(0.038) 
***  '(0.084) 
**  '(0.023) 
***  '(0.039) 
** 
Stake = 10   0.032    0.032    0.023    0.018    0.003    0.000   
  (0.106)    '(0.107)    '(0.107)    '(0.109)    '(0.105)    '(0.106)   
Household annual  -0.002    -0.001    -0.003    -0.003    -0.002    -0.001   
income  (0.005)    '(0.005)    '(0.005)    '(0.005)    '(0.005)    '(0.005)   
Lent money  0.006    0.014    0.013    0.045    0.013    0.020   
often  (0.084)    '(0.086)    '(0.085)    '(0.092)    '(0.083)    '(0.085)   
A trusted  0.193    0.194    0.144    0.117    0.185    0.184   
in round 1  (0.183)    '(0.183)    '(0.184)    '(0.190)    '(0.180)    '(0.180)   
B did not reciprocate  0.360    0.359    0.330    0.307    0.347    0.345   
in round 1  (0.140) 
**  '(0.140) 
**  '(0.141) 
**  '(0.146) 
**  '(0.138) 
**  '(0.139) 
** 
Proportion of Bs  -0.201    -0.183    -0.026    0.159    -0.174    -0.157   
not seen  (0.183)    '(0.187)    '(0.201)    '(0.273)    '(0.181)    '(0.188)   
Constant  -0.047    -0.115    -0.031    -0.285    -0.071    -0.129   
  (0.310)    '(0.345)    '(0.309)    '(0.400)    '(0.303)    '(0.344)   
                         
Observations  94     94     94     94     94     94    
R
2  0.21     0.21     0.21     0.17     0.23     0.23    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%. 
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Table 11. Robustness checks: Improving the measure of what is observed (dependent variable is 
divergence from dictator game results in round 2)  
B diverges,  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 















                         
Proportion of Bs seen  0.529    0.558                   
not reciprocating  '(0.258) 
**  '(0.430)                   
Semicircle          0.124    0.204    0.090    0.091   
measure          '(0.062) 
*  '(0.160)    '(0.038) 
**  '(0.069)   
Stake = 10   0.168    0.168    0.131    0.112    0.107    0.106   
  '(0.156)    '(0.156)    '(0.157)    '(0.163)    '(0.155)    '(0.159)   
Household annual  0.001    0.002    -0.001    -0.002    0.000    0.000   
income  '(0.012)    '(0.012)    '(0.012)    '(0.012)    '(0.012)    '(0.012)   
Lent money  -0.013    -0.013    -0.019    -0.024    -0.025    -0.025   
often  '(0.110)    '(0.110)    '(0.111)    '(0.113)    '(0.109)    '(0.109)   
A trusted  -0.138    -0.141    -0.122    -0.149    -0.107    -0.107   
in round 1  '(0.328)    '(0.330)    '(0.328)    '(0.338)    '(0.322)    '(0.323)   
B did not reciprocate  -0.001    0.000    0.015    0.036    0.039    0.040   
in round 1  '(0.286)    '(0.287)    '(0.287)    '(0.295)    '(0.283)    '(0.286)   
Proportion of Bs  -0.369    -0.359    -0.159    0.089    -0.301    -0.297   
not seen  '(0.292)    '(0.314)    '(0.341)    '(0.574)    '(0.294)    '(0.333)   
Constant  0.336    0.318    0.286    0.046    0.265    0.258   
  '(0.467)    '(0.512)    '(0.478)    '(0.659)    '(0.464)    '(0.530)   
                         
Observations  53     53     53     53     53     53    
R
2  0.18     0.18     0.17     0.14     0.20     0.20    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%. 
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Figure 7. Concentric semicircles from player 15’s point of view 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we present results from an artefactual field experiment conducted in rural Peru that considers 
how observing deviation from a norm of reciprocity influences an individual’s decision to reciprocate. 
Empirically identifying the processes that give rise to a positive relationship between the propensity of an 
individual to behave in a certain way and the prevalence of that behavior in the group is difficult (Manski 
2000). Possible explanations include influence of observed behavior, observed characteristics of group 
members, and common characteristics across individuals. We use exogenous variation in the average 
observed behavior of the group to identify the influence of observed behavior on individual 
decisionmaking. We find that the probability that an individual will deviate from a norm of reciprocity 
increases with the number of others observed to deviate. We posit a model that suggests that this 
endogenous interaction arises as a result of preference interactions between group members: as more 
group members are observed to deviate, the cost of deviation for any individual falls, resulting in a higher 
propensity to deviate. 
We also used random variation in the position of group members to assess how observability 
affects behavior. We did not find that individuals who were more likely to be observed were less likely to 
reciprocate once we had controlled for what the individual observed. 
In documenting how an external shock to the number of those observed to deviate from the norm 
of reciprocity encourages others to deviate, the paper endeavors to provide some insight into how a norm 
of reciprocity can develop or unravel when individuals are learning behavior in a new market institution. 
Further analysis on how behavior is influenced by the relationship between those who are observing and 
those who are observed to deviate would be a nice extension to this analysis. 
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APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
The trust game (TG) and modified trust game (MTG) were conducted according to the following 
procedures: 
•  Location and arrival: Player As were in one geographical location (i.e., village A) and player 
Bs were in a different geographical location (i.e., village B). We chose this procedure in order 
to prevent player As and player Bs from learning each other’s identities at the time of the 
experiment and thus behaving differently. On average two hours before the experiment 
session started, enumerators would locate selected participants within their respective 
villages, informing them of the exact time and location of the study. Subjects were instructed 
to bring photo identification. The experiment session consisted of five stages: (1) sign-in, (2) 
explanation, (3) decisionmaking, (4) survey, and (5) payment. Each stage is described further 
below, with approximate durations in parentheses. 
•  Sign-in (15 minutes): Upon arrival, each subject would present his or her photo ID and be 
signed in. The participant would then draw a number out of a bag. This number randomly 
determined his or her seat and pair number, that is, the individual’s location and pair 
throughout the experiment session. Subjects were not separated by dividers. Thus, random 
seating determined their degree of “observability” and “observableness” during the 
experiment. The layout of the sessions was typically the same. The experimenter was located 
at the front of the room, with three to five rows of four subjects spread across the room and 
the assistant experimenter in an adjacent room or hallway. Once all the subjects were seated, 
the explanation would begin. 
•  Explanation (45 minutes): Each experimenter explained the procedures for playing the TG in 
the same manner. Subjects were informed that they were players A or B. They were then 
informed that they would be playing a game twice with another person in another village of 
Huaral. They were informed that they would not learn the identity of this person and vice 
versa. Subjects were informed that the game would entail the following. Each player (i.e., 
player A and player B) would receive one voucher that was worth an amount  .
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18 The experimenter explained in detail that these vouchers would be exchanged for real money at the end of the session. 
The treatments calibrated   at 5 or 10 Peruvian soles. 
 Upon 
receipt of the voucher, player A would move first. Player A had one of two choices: “send all 
/ keep nothing” ( ) or “keep all / send nothing” ( ). If player A chose  , then that stage of 
the game would end. In other words, each player would keep his or her voucher of   and wait 
for the next play of the game. If player A chose  , then player B would receive three 
additional vouchers (each worth  ) for a total of four vouchers in the amount of  . In turn, 
player A would be left with 0. Player B now had two choices: “send half / keep half” ( ) or 
“keep all / send nothing” ( ). If player B chose  , then each player would end this stage 
with two vouchers in the amount of  . If player B chose  , then player B would end the 
stage with   and player A with 0. Since a substantial proportion of the subjects were 
expected to have difficulty reading, subjects were instructed orally. In order to maintain 
consistency throughout the sessions, both experimenters maintained the same script 
throughout their respective sessions. These scripts were identical across player A and B 
sessions, with the exception of the MTG sessions, where additional information was given to 
the player As. The information on the proportion of player Bs that had reciprocated in a prior 
session was publicly announced, while the individual-specific information was relayed to 
each selected individual privately. Once the game had been explained, the subjects were 
quizzed on their understanding by presenting them with several hypothetical scenarios. In 
particular, the experimenter would propose hypothetical strategies and request players’  
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feedback on their set of available moves or monetary payoffs. This served as an indication of 
issues that needed clarification prior to playing the game. Finally, subjects were instructed 
how to reveal their preference during the game. Subjects would receive two envelopes: one 
white and one yellow. The white envelope was to be used to “keep” vouchers and the yellow 
envelope was to be used to “send” vouchers. This enabled pairs to observe each others’ 
actions. 
•  Decisionmaking (45 minutes): Player As were instructed to reveal their preference by either 
placing the voucher in the yellow envelope or not. While players were instructed to not 
communicate with each other, they were not visually isolated from their peers. Experimenter 
A collected all the yellow envelopes, placed them in an accordion folder (organized/coded by 
seat number) and delivered the folder to assistant experimenter A. Assistant experimenter A 
registered the decisions and called assistant experimenter B to transfer the decisions between 
villages. Assistant experimenter B registered and confirmed the decisions by repeating them, 
placed the corresponding number of vouchers (either three or zero) in the yellow envelopes, 
and placed the envelopes in the corresponding slots of another identical accordion folder. 
Experimenter B handed out the yellow envelopes and instructed the player Bs to check the 
contents of the yellow envelopes. Experimenter B asked the player Bs to reveal their 
preferences according to the contents of the yellow envelope. In particular, those player Bs 
who were sent vouchers had a choice to make. Like the player As previously, they would 
reveal their preferences by putting two vouchers in the yellow envelopes or not. Those player 
Bs who were not sent vouchers had no decision to make and placed their one voucher in the 
white envelope. Experimenter B collected the yellow envelopes, placed them in the accordion 
folder, and handed the folder to assistant experimenter B. Assistant experimenter B registered 
the decisions and called assistant experimenter A, who in turn registered and confirmed the 
decisions, and then placed the number of vouchers in the yellow envelopes. Experimenter A 
then handed out the yellow envelopes and instructed the player As to review the contents of 
their yellow envelopes. Any remaining vouchers at the end of the stage went into the white 
envelopes. This process was repeated twice. 
•  Survey (30 minutes): All subjects participated in a short household survey. This survey was 
conducted by the enumerators. 
•  Payment (15 minutes): Sessions lasted on average two and one half hours. Upon completion 
of the session, subjects were paid in private by the assistant experimenter for the following: 
(a) session earnings, (b) show-up earnings, (c) survey earnings, and (d) dictator game (DG) 
earnings. 
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